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AGENT.

Right of Attorney to bind Cient in Case Stated-Liability of Agent
on PersonalContract- What Contracts are within the ,Statuteof Frauds.
-- Semble, that an attorney at law has authority to bind his client by
stating a case for the judgment of the court: Whitcomb et al. v. Ke hart et al., 14 Wright.
Where, after a contract made by G. with a lumbering firm to cut
saw-logs on their land, and a sub-contract by him to K. & Brother, a
new contract was entered into between the K.'s, G., and W. & Sons,
who were the general agents of the firm, but did not sign the contract
as such,-whereby it was stipulated that the K.'s should go on wit'i
their work, and that W. & Sons should pay according to the sub-contract
rate, except so far as G. himself should pay them out of the sum coming to him under the original contract; after completion of the work
by the K.'s, and suit brought by them against W. & Sons for the balance
due, which was admitted in a case stated by the attorneys of the parties,
.ield, That as the defendants contracted to pay personally, and not as
agents, out of money furnished by their principals, they were personally
liable, and that the entry of judgment by the court on the case stated
was not error: Id.
The undertaking oh the part of the defendants was original, and therefore not within the Statute of Frauds : Id.
AGREEMENT.

Equitable Relief.-It is not the province of courts of equity to relieve
parties failing to perform their contracts, from the legal consequence of
such failure, unless it has resulted from mistake, fraud, or accident, or
the acts and dealings of the parties show an assen6 to the delay by the
I From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 35 and 36 Illinois Reports.
2 From N. Brewer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 21 Maryland Reports.
s From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter, to appear in Tol. 10 of his Reports.
4 From C. C. Whittlesey, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 36 Missouri Reports.
5 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 44 of his Reports.
6 From R. E. Wright, Esq., late Reporter; to appear in vol. 14 of his Reports.
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party insisting upon the forfeiture, and it appears that under the circumstances it would be inequitable for him to insist upon it: Tibbs v.
Morris, 44 Barb.
Within the Statute of Frauds.-B.let W. have ten sheep, of a certain quality and grade of wool, W. agreeing to deliver to B. at the end
of four years twenty sheep of as good quality and grade. At the expiration of four years the parties made another agreement, by which W.
instead of delivering the twenty sheep then due, promised to deliver to
B. forty sheep of as good quality and grade at the end of four years
more, which B. agreed to accept in lieu of said twenty sheep. .eld,
that the last agreement was within that provision of the Statute of
Frauds which makes void every oral agreement, that by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from the making thereof: Bartlett
v. Wheeler et al., 44 Barb.
Although an agreement on which a party relies is void by the Statute
of Frauds, he is not, in general, without remedy, inasmuch as where a
contract has been fully performed, and the performance accepted, a recovery may be had on a guantum reruit or valebat, if not on the contract
itself: Id.
ATTACHMENT.

Garnishee.-The garnishee stands in the position of the defendant in
the attachment suit, and any defence which he can set up against such
defendant, he may also use in resisting the claim of the attachingcreditor: Friebaughet al. v. Stone, 36 MIo.
ATTORNEY

Authority.-Where several suits were brought by the same plaintiff
against different defendants, the referees being the same in each case,
the attorneys of the several parties agreed that all the cases should abide
the final decision in one case: held, that the agreement was within the
authority of the attorneys, and was binding upon the parties: North
No. Railroad Co. v. Stephens, 36 Mo.
BANKS.

Constitutionaltyof National Bank Acts.-National banks are instruments employed by the government of the United States in the prosecution of its fiscal operations; and their creation is within the constitutional power of Congress: TWTe People ex rel. Lincoln v. The Assessors
of the Tozon of Barton, 44 Barb.
The proviso of the Act of Congress, passed February 25th 1862,
prohibiting the taxation, under state laws, of the shares in national
banks, at a higher rate than is imposed upon the shares of the state
banks, was within the constitutional power of Congress to make, and is
valid and controlling: .d.
Assessors have no authority under the Act of the Legislature: of
March 9th 1865, enabling the banks of this state to become banKing
associations under the laws of the United States, to assess the shares of
a stockholder in a national bank: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Attorney-Assignrment.-An attorney who receives a note for collec-
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tion, after its maturity, has no power to sell or assign the note: Goodfellow v. Lamlis, 86 Mo.
Guaranty-Assignment.--An indorsement of a promissory note by
the payee, in this form: "I guaranty the collection of the within note,"
is nothing more than a simple assignment; for, by the statute of Illinois,
the assignor, in every case, unless restricted by the terms of the assignment, undertakes that the note can be collected, and if it cannot be,
then he will pay it. On such an indorsement, if due diligence to collect the note is shown, the indorser is liable. An assignee of a negotiable note is not bound to sue the maker out of the county where the
latter resides. Ordinary diligence to collect, is all to which the assignee
is bound: Judson v. Goodwin, 86 Illinois.
Protest-lndorsers-Evdence.-To secure the liability of the indorsers of a bill of exchange or negotiable promissory note, demand of
payment must be made of all the makers, and notice of demand and
refusal must be given to the indorsers. A notary's protest which stated
"that he presented the same at the office of the makers and was refused
payment," without stating from whom payment was demanded, does not
show a proper demand and refusal of payment. In a suit against
indorsers, such protest may be properly excluded as evidence. A
demand of payment may be made by the holder of a note or bill, or any
agent for him: Nave v. Richardson et al., 36 Mo.
Grace-Bank--heglgence-Action.-A check drawn upon a bank,
requesting it to pay money, at a day subsequent'to its date, to a third
party, or order, is entitled to grace; and a presentment on the day
named is not a good presentment so as to bind an indorser upon demand
and refusal of payment and notice: Ivory v. Bank of the State of Missouri, 86 Mo.
A bank receiving for collection a check payable at a subsequent date,
and presenting the same for payment upon' the day named without
allowing days of grace, is liable to an action by the owner of the check
for its negligence in making demand: .d.
Protest-Evidence _Aotary Public.-The official protest of a notary
is the proper legal evidence of the presentment, demand, and refusal of
payment of a foreign bill of exchange, and such protest cannot be dispensed with as in cases of inland bills: Commercial Bank of Kentucky
v. Barksdale et al., 36 Mo.
The presentment and demand of payment of a foreign bill of exchange
must be made by the same notary who protests the bill; it cannot be
done by his clerk, nor by any other person as his agent, although he
be also a notary. Notaries are public officers, and as such cannot act as
partners. A protest made by one notary, when another notary made
.tne
demand of payment, is not a legal protest. The protest, or the
nuting of the bill for protest, must be made upon the same day the presentment is made: id.
CoMIssIONs.
20 per Cent.-A commission of 20 per cent. for the collection of
assigned accounts, consisting of small bills of book accounts, which
cause much trouble and loss of time in their collection, is not unreasonable: Wynkoop, Receiver, &c., v. Shardlow et al., 44 Barb.
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CORPORATION.

Measure of Damages for refusing to permit a Transfer of StockPower of Attorney to transfer, valid, though executed in Blank.-In an
action against an association for refusing to permit a transfer of stock,
the measure of damages is its actual value at the time of the refusal
to transfer: German Union Building Association v. Sendmeyer, 14
Wright.
The delivery by an owner of stock of a power of attorney to transfer,
executed in blank, with the certificates, is evidence of an implied
authority to fill up the power with the name of an attorney to make the
transfer: Id.
Equity-.Bill to enforce Performanceof Public Duties by a Corporation, not maintainable at Suit of Private Party.-A bill in equity to
enforce the performance of public duties by' a corporation, cannot be
maintained by a private party in the aibsence of a special right or authority: Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. The Lehigh Coal and Nay. Co., 14
Wright.
Therefore, where the slackwater navigation of the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company, with dams, locks, and other devices, were damaged, broken, and swept away by the flood of the 4th of June 1862, it
was held, that a bill in equity could not be maintained by another company, to enjoin the respondents from neglecting to repair and put in
operation their navigation; and that complainants had no right to a
decree compensating them for any damages suffered as incident to the
non-repair:* id.
Semble, that a bill for an injunction, sued out on the part of the Commonwealth by the attorney-general, would lie against the respondents' to
compel them to observe their charter obligations: Id.
Amotion, and Difranchisement of Members of Private Corporations,
discussed and distinguished.-The power of amotion for adequate cause
is an inherent incident of all corporations, whether municipal or private,
except, perhaps, such as are literary or eleemosynary; but the exercise
of this power does not affect the private rights of the corporator in the
franchise: Evans v. The Philadelphia Club, 14 Wright.
The power of disfranchisement which does destroy the member's franchise must in general be conferred by statute, and is never sustained as an
incidental power except on conviction of the member in a court of justice
for an infamous offence, and for the commission of some act against the
sceiety which tends to its destruction or injury: Id.
Thuugh the power to make by-laws is incidental to corporations, and
is generally expressly conferred by statute, yet by-laws which vest in a
majority the power of expulsion for minor offences are, in so far, void,
and expulsions made under them will not be sustained in courts of justice: Id.
In joint stock companies or in any corporation owning property, no
power of expulsion can be exercised unless expressly conferred by the
charter: Id.
Where two members of a private corporation or club were sitting together in conversation in the bar-room of the club-house, a third came in
and used insulting language, understood by one of the two to be applied
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to himself, who thereupon struck the offender: the act was held not
such as would justify his expulsion from the club, by the members
thereof: Id.
COUNTY.

Action-Neglect of Duty.-Counties are quasi corporations, created by
the legislature for purposes of public policy, and are not responsible for
the neglect of duties enjoined on them, unless the action is given by
statute: Reardon v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo.
CRIMINAL LAw.

Appellate Jurisdictionof Supreme Court in Capital Cases- General
Threats, when Evidence of Malice on Trial for .Murder-Recordof
Finding of Grand Jury, when Sunffcient-Evidence.-The Supreme
Court have no power in capital cases to review points which were not
taken in the court below nor filed-of record, but are confined to exceptions taken on the trial to some question of law or evidence, or to the
opinion of the court below upon a written point, which, together with
the decision, must be filed of record as in civil cases: Hopkins v. The
Commonwealth, 14 Wright.
Threats made by a prisoner within an hour before the commission of
the murder, that "he would kill somebody before twenty-four hours,"
are evidence of malice prepense, though they did not expressly refer to
the deceased, and if he killed anybody in pursuance of such malice, it
was murder in the first degree: Id.
The short entry on the docket of" true bill," is a sufficient record of
the finding of the grand jury: Id.
ERROR.

Practice.-Where no exceptions are saved in the inferior court, the
Supreme Court will only notice errors apparent on the face of the
record: Mason v. Barnardet al., 86 Mo.
INNKEEPER.

Liab7t1 of, for Goods of a Guest, lost or stolen.-Innkeepers are
liable for the goods of a guest brought infra hospitiurm, though not delivered to him, or his attention specially called to them, and though the
person who may have stolen or carried them away is unknown: Burrows
v. Trkber, 21 Md.
It is not necessary when the goods are proved to have been lost or
stolen,- to show negligence on the part of the innkeeper to fix his liability: Id.
Such liability may, however, be discharged, where the loss is the
result of inevitable accident, or the acts of nublic enemies; or where
the owner takes upon himself the care of his property, though it still
be infra hosptiumn, and its loss or injury may be attributed to his own
neglect, while a guest at the inn: Id.
LANDS.

Pre-Emption-Equit.-TheAct of Congress concerning pre-emptions, gives the officers of the land department the right to determine
all questions arising between different settlers. The fee of the lands in
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this state being originally in the government, and Congress being vested
exclusively with the primary disposal of the soil, the presumption is in
favor of the action of the officers designated to execute the laws made
for that purpose. Where the officers are vested with discretionary
power, their acts are not subject to the revision of our courts; but when
they act without authority of or in violation of law, then jurisdiction
will be assumed. A patent carries the legal title, and the presumption
is that all necessary preliminary steps have been taken, and in favor of
its validity, and the burden of proof is upon him who impeaches it:
Bill v. .lliller, 36 o.
LANDLORD AND

TENANT.

Where the military authorities took possession of demised premises,
and held possession of the same without the consent of the lessee after
the expiration of the term: Held, that the lessee was not liable for rent
of the premises after the expiration of the term, although he had
received from the government the rents accruing during the term: (onstant v. .Abell, 36 Alo.
M1ORTGAGE.

Practice-Deedof Trust-Notes-Mortgagor-Substitution.-Under
the statute of this state, the proceeding for the foreclosure of the equity
of redemption of a mortgage, or deed of trust, is a proceeding at law
and not in equity: Mason v. Barnardet al., 36 Mo.
Where a deed of trust given to secure the payment of several notes
falling due at different dates-provided, that if any should remain
unpaid after it fell due, that then all the notes should become due-the
notes become due only for the purpose of distributing the fund realized
by the sale under the power. Such a provision will not authorize the
rendition of a personal judgment against the maker before the notes
mature : Id.
A. executed a deed of trust, in the nature of a mortgage, to secure a
debt, and subsequently by deed-poll conveyed the property to B., reciting in the conveyance that part of the consideration was the payment
of the incumbrance by B.: Held, that B. could not be considered as a
mortgagor, and that a personal judgment against B. for the mortgagedebt was erroneous: R. C. 1855, p. 1089, §§ 10, 14: Id.
MIUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Streets-Sidewalks-Bridges-Duty of, to make and re'pairthem.Cities are under a political obligation to open such streets as the convenience of the community requires; but courts cannot compel the performance of such a duty, or hold them responsible for its non-performance: Oity of Joliet v. Verley, 85 Ill.
The legal obligation of a city to repair highways, streets, sidewalks,
and bridges, within its corporate limits, is one voluntarily assumed by
its corporate authorities, and relates to such as are opened or constructed,
or allowed to be opened or constructed, under its authority, and those
which its officers assume control over for that purpose: Id.
So, the trustees of a canal cannot, by building a bridge over their
canal within the limits of a city, impose upon the city the burden of
keeping it in repair. Until the city assumes control over a bridge
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erected without its assent or authority, it is not liable for its not being
Id.
kept in repair:
Nor is a city under any obligation to make approaches or passageways to a bridge so erected for the convenience of its citizens. Its obligation in this respect is the same as that in relation to opening new
streets: d.
Where a bridge is erected across a canal within the corporate limits
of a city, without the authority of the city, as long as the trustees of the
canal do not object, the city has ample authority to make approaches to
the bridge and exercise control over them: Id.
And where the city, in the exercise of its authority, undertakes to
make the passageways to a bridge erected under such circumstances,
there can be no doubt of its obligation so to exercise its authority as not
to endanger the lives or limbs of its inhabitants: Id.
If stone steps leading from an abutment of the bridge are so situated
that no approach can be made which will be Aafe for the passage of travellers, it is a gross violation of duty on the part of the city to undertake
to make one. Cities have no right to set man-traps thoughout their
limits, and excuse themselves from liability for injuries resulting therefrom, on the ground that the localities are such that they could not
render the places where they sit, safe and secure. If they cannot construct works so that they will be safe and secure, they can let them
alone : Id.
NEGLIGENCE.

Railroad Companies-Liabityf
for Injuries to Passengers.-Arailway
passenger-train, moving at the rate of twenty-five miles an hour, waa
thrown from the track in consequence of the displacement of a rail of
the main stem at a switch, occasionally used by a dirt train. At the
time of the accident the switch indicator-it having been broken and
deranged-indicated that the switch was in a position to be passed in
safety; but it also appeared, that in consequence of their location with
reference to a curve in the road, neither the indicatornor the rails of
the switch themselves could have been seen by the engineer in time to
have averted the accident. In an action for damages by a passenger
who had been injured by the accident: Held,
1. That the occurrence of the accident and injury to the plaintiff were
prim4 facie evidence of neglect, and imposed upon the railroad company the onus of showing "the most exact care and diligence, not only
in the management of the trains and cars but also in the structure and
care of the track, and in all the subsidiary arrangements necessary to
the safety of the passengers: Citing 4 Cush. 402.
2. That it was the province of the court to furnish to the jury the
legal rule or standard by which the obligation of the railroad company
was to be determined; but it was a question for the jury to determine
fron. all the evidence, whether the injury to the plaintiff arose from any
negligence on the part of the defendants or their agents; and if the
jury should find that the injury was the result of an accident, or act
against which human foresight and care could not guard, and was not
the result of negligence in any degree on the part of the defendants, the
plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
3. That in determining these questions, the jury were correctly
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instructed to have regard to the character of railroad transportation:
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Wortington, 21 Md.
PARTNERSHIP.

Dormant Partrer.-In case of a dormant partnership, while the
credit is given to an ostensible partner, because no other is known to the
creditor, yet the creditor may also sue the the secret partner when discovered, and the credit will not be presumed to have been given on the
sole responsibility of the ostensible partner: Richardson et al. v. Far-.
,ner, 36 Mo.
RAILROADS.

Trepasses-Nuisances.-Inthe absence of any negligence, unskilfulness, or mismanagement in the construction of an embankment for the
bed of a railroad over land through which there was no natural channel
for the passage of water, the injury done by such embankment in causing
the water to overflow the land of the adjoining proprietors must be
considered as the natural consequence of what the corporation had
acquired the lawful right to do by a condemnation of the land and the
assessment of damages therefor, and such damages must be taken to
have been included in the compensation assessed: Clark's Administrator
v. Ran. & St. Jo. Railroad Company, 36 Mo.
REPLEVIN.

Action against Officer.-The owner of goods cannot maintain an
action against an officer for taking them in the due service of a writ of
replevin against another person who bad them in his possession: Willard
v. Kimball, 10 Allen
STAMP.

Evidence.-Under the Act of Congress of March 3d 1865, a note
executed before June 1st 1863 is admissible in evidence, if the proper
stamp be affixed before it is thus offered: Deny v. Baker et al., 36 Mo.
TRESPASS.

Damages.-Exemplary damages would seem to mean in the ordinary
and proper sense of the words, such aamages as would be a good round
compensation, and an adequate recompense for the injury sustained, and
such as might serve for a wholesome example to others in like eases.
Where the defendants, forming part of a body of armed men, forcibly
broke and entered the plaintiff's store, putting him in bodily fear, and
took and carried away a large portion of the plaintiff's stock of goods,
injuring his business, the mere value of the goods taken, with interest
thereon, is not the proper measure of damages: Frenlenheitv. Edmond.
son et al., 36 Mo.
TRIAL.

Practice-nstructions.--Wherethe plaintiff has closed his evidence,
and it has no tendency whatever to prove the issue necessary to a recovery, the court may determine the whole case as a matter of law: Boland
v Missouri Railroad Co., 36 Mo.

